...das Ende der Big Three?

[Toaschtn]

Noch kurz zuvor hatte die US-Regierung die Richter aufgerufen, das Verfahren nicht zu blockieren und vor „schweren Konsequenzen“ gewarnt. Chrysler hatte erklärt, 100 Millionen Dollar für jeden weiteren Tag Verzögerung zu verlieren.

http://www.focus.de/finanzen/news/chrys ... 06507.html

[Toaschtn]

„Die Allianz Chrysler-Fiat kann nun weitergehen“, erklärte das Weiße Haus. Sie erlaube es, dass Chrysler aus der Krise als „konkurrenz- und lebensfähiger Autobauer“ hervorgehe.

http://www.faz.net/s/RubD16E1F55D21144C ... googlefeed

[tobi]

GM targeting metropolitan Cadillac dealers for closure?

There are 1,422 Cadillac dealers nationwide, more than four times the number of Mercedes-Benz dealers and more than six times the number of Lexus dealers. That kind of saturation meant that in 2008, the average Cadillac dealership did one-sixth the business of a Mercedes dealer and one-tenth the business of a Lexus dealer.

http://www.autoblog.com/2009/06/09/unde ... r-closure/

[coolchevy]

und was noch niemand sagte, die bestehenden Milliarden Beträge die GM den Pensionskassen noch schuldet kann auch bei Genesung wieder nach ein paar Jahren in den Ruin treiben. Und diese Beträge werden über die Unions eingeklagt und sind ein Ballast der ca. 20% vom zu erwartenden Umsatz ausmachen kann und wird. Das eigene System das mit 50 in Pension gegangen werden kann bei vollem Lohn kostet in Jahr and die 6 Mrd. USD zu den üblichen 54 Jahren!

darauf verzichten wird aber sicher keiner der darauf die letzten 20 Jahre hingearbeitet hat

Auch bei Insolvenz jetzt, GM steckt in richtigen Schwierigkeiten und bleibt das wahrscheinlich auch noch länger

[Kevman]

Mal schaun was Fiat den Chryslern bringt...

[grazyfrog]

Nichts gutes, das ist mal sicher

[coolchevy]

wieso?

dann gibt es endlich wieder "letter cars" von Chrysler.........Chrysler 500 Abarth, hat schon was

[eric1617]

Ich meinte gelesen zu habe, dass bei der GM-Insolvenz die Pensionisten um ihre Kohle umfallen ?

[coolchevy]

nein, hätte GM so gepasst. Jedoch hat BHO el Presidente ja viele Stimmen aus den Unions rekrutiert und das Risiko ging er natürlich nicht ein.

hier der Text
By Tony Jackson
Published: June 7 2009 16:51 | Last updated: June 7 2009 16:51



In the thunderous collapse of General Motors last week, one detail seems to have gone almost unnoticed. The old GM’s US pension fund, with its near-$100bn (£63bn) of liabilities, is being transferred lock, stock and barrel to the new entity. As a direct result, the new GM could be bankrupt again in a very few years.
From a UK perspective, this insouciance seems curious. But the US is somewhat behind the game in grasping the scale of the corporate pensions crisis.
The key moves which flush that crisis into the open – the marking of deficits to market, their inclusion on balance sheets, and the official requirement that they should be made good – are all now in place in the US. But they still have the force of novelty.
The UK, by contrast, was an early mover, and last week’s closure of final-salary schemes by big corporations such as BP and Barclays was correspondingly big news. Depressingly, though, there are other indications – which I shall come to – that radical UK attempts to address the crisis are running into the sand.
But first, back to GM. Much of the detail here I owe to the independent UK consultant John Ralfe. His thesis can be briefly stated.
GM’s US fund is, of course, in deficit, but the company has made no contributions since 2003. Back then, it put in $18.5bn, which it raised through a bond issue. Since this counted as a pre-payment, GM is not obliged to pay any more for the next year or two. However, it will then have to start plugging the gap, under the new rules set down by the Pension Protection Act of 2006. This, Mr Ralfe calculates, would involve diverting $1bn to $2bn annually from operating cash flows. If GM cannot do that, bang it goes again.
At that point, the fund would be taken over by the official Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC). Why did that not happen this time round?
Because, Mr Ralfe suggests, of the legal terms under which the PBGC operates.
Its maximum annual payment is $54,000 for a 65-year-old, but only $20,000 for a 50-year-old. And in Detroit, it is commonplace for car workers to retire on full pension at 50.
The PBGC has calculated that if it took over all the auto industry’s pensions, members would lose 40 per cent on average.
A 50-year-old GM pensioner with a $54,000 annual entitlement, Mr Ralfe reckons, would lose 60 per cent. Add that all up, and GM’s annual $9bn pension bill would be cut by $3.5bn.
And so, in an exercise which has inflicted various degrees of loss on GM’s shareholders and bondholders, the 670,000 members of the pension fund are protected. Anything else, it seems, would be politically impossible.
The snag is, of course, that if new GM goes bust a few years from now, the bill to the PBGC will have gone up to the tune of the $3.5bn a year that would otherwise have been saved. When we put that in the context of a GM fund with assets of $91bn at the last count, it is not trivial.
Nor is it trivial in the context of the PBGC, which – as I have written in this column before – is seriously underfunded, and has just reported a deficit of $33.5bn for the year to March. The whole problem, in short, has not been addressed, just kicked down the road.
The nagging question that remains is whether the whole system or corporate pensions can be rescued. Increasingly, the external risks and volatility of these schemes cannot be afforded by the companies themselves. And the official rescue schemes set up in both the US and UK are nowhere near big enough to shoulder the burden.
For a while, it seemed that a promising alternative had been found in the UK, in the form of pension buy-out firms.
A number were launched from 2006 onwards, pulling in capital from the big investing institutions to take pension schemes off companies’ hands.
This infusion of capital, if sustainable, could have had a galvanising effect. But at least one of those new firms, it appears, is now in effect closed to new business.
Dawid Konotey-Ahulu, an ex-Merrill Lynch banker and founder of pension consultants Redington, points out that when the model was launched, the weather was very different. Now, he argues, its viability is in question.
It is not that these firms are in any sense at risk. Rather, the cost of buy-outs has risen sharply in today’s more demanding conditions, and institutional capital seems to have dried up.
The conclusion is depressing but unavoidable. Some countries are only now confronting the pensions crisis, while those who did so earlier have yet to solve it. Where are those innovative investment bankers when you need them?

BHO has strong ties to the UAW because of strong voter support and will protect them and it's interests. It's bad enough to watch what GM has become, but it's far worse to see them refuse to shed the legacy which helped put them in this situation to begin with.

[tobi]

Chrysler’s Viper business is now owned by Fiat

http://www.edmunds.com/insideline/do/Ne ... eId=150326

[ZTYP]

Jetzt gehört den Spaghettifressern die Viper?

[D.I.Cruiser]

Jetzt gehört den Spaghettifressern die Viper?

Jup,in zukunft wird die viper a bisserl kürzer ausfallen!

Die kloanen italiener sollten ja auch übers lenkrad drüber sehn.

Bin schon neugirieg auf die viper abarth.

[tobi]

Chrysler And Fiat Alliance Official

http://jalopnik.com/5285874/chrysler-an ... e-official

[albandy]

US-Regierung macht Druck bei GM-Rettung

http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,633594,00.html

[Kevman]

Jetzt gehört den Spaghettifressern die Viper?

Oida....krank